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Abstract
We assume a community whose members adopt one of two opinions. Each member
appears as an inflexible, or as a non-contrarian or contrarian floater. An inflexible
adheres to its opinion, whereas a floater may change into a floater of the alternative
opinion. The occurrence of this change is governed by the local majority rule: members
meet in groups of a fixed size, and a floater changes provided its opinion has the
minority in its group. A non-contrarian floater keeps the opinion it adopts under
the local majority rule, whereas a contrarian floater adopts the alternative opinion.
We determine the dynamics generated by repeated opinion changes, and study its
dependence on the densities of inflexibles and the frequencies of contrarians among the
floaters. We restrict ourselves to groups of size at most 3.
Keywords: Sociomathematics, sociophysics, opinions dynamics, local majority rule, con-
trarian behaviour, floating behaviour
NOTE concerning the current version of the text: due to the large sizes of some
figures, the accompanying captions to these figures do not fit together with the
figures on the same page. Therefore, these captions are placed in the main text,
instead of in the sequence of Figures at the end of the text.
1 Introduction
Within the growing field of sociophysics (see [1] for the defining paper, and [3]-[6] for an
impression of the recent state of the art), two- and three states Galam opinion models and
their modifications ([3], [6]) play a guiding role in analyzing the process of opinion spreading
in communities. These models are centered around the local majority rule (l.m.r.), which
is applied either in a deterministic or a probabilistic way. In the basic deterministic case,
supporters of the (two or three) opinions present in a community are randomly distributed
over all possible groups of a fixed size. Within each group the members adopt the opinion
that has the majority in that group, after which all group members are recollected again.
In case there is no majority in a group, its members stick to their own opinion (i.e., neutral
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treatment; the probabilistic treatment in case of a tie assigns opinions to the group mem-
bers according to a certain probability distribution). Repeated application of this principle
generates what is called randomly localized dynamics with a local majority rule ([6]). In the
basic probabilistic case, the community members are divided among groups of various sizes
according to some probability distribution, and within each group all members adopt one of
the possible opinions with a certain probability.
In the basic deterministic two states opinion model, fast dynamics occurs in which the
opinion that originally has the majority eventually will obtain complete presence at the cost
of the alternative opinion. In the probabilistic two states opinion model, the final outcome
depends on the probability distributions for group sizes and local adaptation. Eventually
the state of the community can be either a polarization on the initial majority or minority,
or a perfect consensus on both opinions (see [3], which unifies basic probabilistic two states
opinion models). In [6] a three states opinion model is introduced in which the community
members are randomly distributed over groups of size 3. Within each group the l.m.r. is
applied, with the additional rule that in case of a tie all members of the group adopt one of
the three opinions according to some probability distribution. It is shown that the dynamics
leads to fast polarization on one of the three opinions, which may be an opinion that initially
has a minor presence in the community.
To add more realism to opinion models, in [2] the basic deterministic two states Galam
opinion model is extended by the introduction of so-called contrarians. A contrarian is a
community member who, instead of the opinion it should adopt under the l.m.r., switches
to the alternative opinion. Depending on the density of contrarians as well as on group size,
their presence either leads to a stabilization of the opinion dynamics in which one opinion (the
one with the lower density of contrarians) dominates the other, to an equilibrium in which
neither opinion dominates (in case both opinions have equal densities of contrarians), or (in
case of relatively large densities of contrarians for both opinions) to a dynamics in which
the dominating opinion constantly alternates between the two opinions. The incorporation
of contrarians in opinion dynamics models is a step towards an explanation of the “hung
elections” outcome in several recent voting events (the U.S.A. presidential elections in 2000,
the German elections in 2002 and 2005, as well as the 2006 Italian elections, see [2], [5]), in
which one strategy achieved only a very narrow gain at the cost of another strategy. The
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origin of contrarian behaviour as well as its implications have been the focus of various other
recent studies, see [8], [11], [12], [13].
In a recent paper ([4]) the basic deterministic two states Galam model has been modified
by introducing opinion supporters that express what in politics (and other games) is called
inflexible behavior. An inflexible community member is a supporter that under all conditions
sticks to its opinion. Under this terminology supporters that switch opinion when in the
minority then classify as floaters, and we shall use this distinction in what follows. In [4]
the effect of inflexible behavior on opinion dynamics is studied for the case that opinion
supporters repeatedly meet in groups of fixed size 3. It is shown that a small density of
inflexibles for only one of the two opinions allows for the existence of two local attractors.
One of these local attractors is a mixed one, on which both opinions are present and on which
the opinion that is supported by inflexibles is a minority. The other attractor is a single
state attractor, on which the opinion that is supported by inflexibles has complete majority,
i.e., its density equals 1, the other opinion being absent. Due to the presence of these two
attractors, the outcome of the opinion dynamics thus depends on the initial condition, the
basin of attraction for the mixed local attractor being relatively small compared to that for
the single state attractor. If the density of inflexibles is sufficiently large (approximately
17%), the mixed attractor disappears and the single state attractor becomes global. In
case both opinions have small and equal densities of inflexibles there are two mixed local
attractors. These two attractors are symmetrically situated with regard to a separator on
which both opinions are present with density 0.5. A change in the density of inflexibles for
one of the opinions breaks this symmetry, and a sufficiently large increase may lead to a
global attractor on which the opinion with the larger density of inflexibles has the majority,
see [4]. Recently, the effect of inflexibles and floaters on opinion dynamics has also been
studied in [9] and [10].
In this paper we combine the approaches presented in [2] and [4], by allowing for groups
composed of inflexibles as well as contrarian and non-contrarian opinion supporters. For
clarity we restrict ourselves to groups of fixed size at most 3. For both opinions we assume
fixed densities for the inflexibles. Also, we consider the contrarians to be part of the floaters,
i.e., in a given group the contrarians first determine their opinion according to the l.m.r., and
subsequently change to become a floater (not necessarily a contrarian) for the alternative
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opinion (which thus may be the opinion that the contrarian initially was supporting). The
presence of contrarians for each opinion is quantitatively expressed as a fixed fraction of the
density of floaters of the respective opinion. In case of a tie in groups of size 2 we apply the
neutral treatment. After an opinion update, all supporters for both opinions are recollected
and then are redistributed again, either as an inflexible or as a non-contrarian or contrarian
floater, according to the fixed densities for inflexibles and the fixed fractions of contrarians
for the two opinions. We study qualitative characteristics of the opinion dynamics gener-
ated by repeated updates. In particular we study changes in the number of equilibria, and
changes from monotone to alternating dynamics, due to changes in parameter combinations.
A detailed mathematical treatment of the generated opinion dynamics, for groups of arbi-
trary size, shall be given in a forthcoming paper ([7]).
Notation
We denote the two opinions by A and B. The densities of inflexibles for the A and B opinion
are denoted by αA and αB respectively, with 0 ≤ αA ≤ 1 as well as 0 ≤ αB ≤ 1, and in addi-
tion 0 ≤ αA+αB ≤ 1. Since the roles of the A and B opinion are interchangeable in deriving
the opinion dynamics, we may without loss of generality assume that 0 ≤ αA ≤ 0.5, and we
shall do so in what follows. The fraction of contrarians among the A floaters is denoted by
γA, and γB denotes the fraction of contrarians among the B floaters, with both 0 ≤ γA ≤ 1
and 0 ≤ γB ≤ 1. The size of the groups in which opinion supporters meet is denoted by L.
The density of the A opinion at time t = 0, 1, 2, · · · (or after t updates) shall be denoted as
pt. Note that for given αA and αB the density pt necessarily lies in the interval [αA, 1− αB]
(independent of L, γA or γB). With fL;αA,αB ;γA,γB we denote the function that determines
the density of the A opinion after application of the l.m.r. followed by the switch of the
contrarians. Thus, pt+1 = fL;αA,αB ;γA,γB(pt). Setting γA = γB = 0, pt+1 = fL;αA,αB ;0,0(pt)
then gives the density obtained from pt when the l.m.r. is applied without being followed
by the switch of the contrarians. In the Appendix tables are given, presenting all possible
group compositions in terms of inflexibles and non-contrarian and contrarian floaters for
group sizes L = 1 to 3, together with the effects of the l.m.r. and the opinion changes of
contrarians. It is assumed that the community is sufficiently large to allow for the derivation
of the density of each possible group composition in the ensemble of all groups of a fixed size
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from the densities in the community of the constituents of a group. From these tables the
expressions for fL;αA,αB ;γA,γB are obtained.
With
−−−−−−−−−→
fL;αA,αB ;γA,γB we denote the dynamics generated by repeated application of fL;αA,αB ;γA,γB
in subsequent timesteps. Furthermore, pˆL;αA,αB ;γA,γB denotes an asymptotically stable equi-
librium for
−−−−−−−−−→
fL;αA,αB ;γA,γB , and p
∗
L;αA,αB ;γA,γB
refers to an asymptotically stable periodic point.
We now turn to the treatment of the opinion dynamics for group sizes L = 1, 2 and 3.
2 L = 1
The case L = 1 resembles a community in which each member is unaffected by other com-
munity members in determining its opinion, and the only changes in opinion come from the
contrarians. The contributions to the A density after application of the local majority rule
is obtained from the second column in Table 1 in Appendix 6.1. This column obviously is
equal to the first one, since in groups of size 1 local majority is automatically obtained, but
is without effect on the opinion densities. These contributions are: αA for the A inflexibles,
and p−αA for the (non-contrarian and contrarian) A floaters. Their sum is p, and we obtain
that
pt+1 = f1;αA,αB ;0,0(pt) = pt; (1)
consequently, each p ∈ [αA, 1−αB] is a neutrally stable equilibrium for the opinion dynamics.
In case only (non-contrarian and contrarian) floaters are involved both αA and αB are equal
to 0, and we restrict ourselves to the contributions from the second, third, fifth and sixth line
in the table. Since the l.m.r. leaves each group of size 1 unaffected, a switch by a contrarian
in this case necessarily implies a change to the opinion it initially does not support. Thus,
here also a contribution to the A density comes from the group that initially consists of only
B contrarians, as these will turn into A floaters. In this case we obtain for the contribution
to the A density:
pt+1 = f1;0,0;γA,γB(pt) = (1− γA)pt + γB(1− pt) = γB +
(
1− (γA + γB)
)
pt. (2)
The effect of both inflexibles and non-contrarian as well as contrarian floaters is obtained
by adding all the expressions in the last column: the contributions αA due to the invariant
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density of A inflexibles, (1 − γA)(pt − αA) from the non-contrarian A floaters, and γB(1 −
αB − pt) from the contrarian B floaters. This yields:
pt+1 = f1;αA,αB ;γA,γB(pt)
= αA + (1− γA)(pt − αA) + γB(1− αB − pt)
= αAγA + (1− αB)γB +
(
1− (γA + γB)
)
pt.
(3)
It follows that if γA + γB > 0, then
pˆ =
αAγA + (1− αB)γB
γA + γB
(4)
is the unique equilibrium for the opinion dynamics
−−−−−−−−→
f1;αA,αB ;γA,γB . Due to its linearity as a
function of pt, expression (3) implies that the dynamical characteristics of this equilibrium
are governed solely by the frequencies of the contrarians. The equilibrium is asymptotically
stable if and only if 0 < γA + γB < 2. For 0 < γA + γB < 1 the equilibrium is approached
monotonically, with an increase in the A density if and only if its initial value is less then
the equilibrium value. For γA + γB = 1, the function f1;αA,αB ;γA,γB is constant and equals
αAγA + (1− αB)γB; the opinion dynamics then reaches its equilibrium in one iteration. For
1 < γA + γB < 2, the equilibrium is approached alternately. For γA + γB = 2, i.e., both
γA = 1 and γB = 1, the equilibrium equals 0.5(1 + αA − αB) and is neutrally stable; each
p ∈ [αA, 1− αB] different from 0.5(1 + αA − αB) generates a neutrally stable cycle of length
2.
On the equilibrium, the A opinion has the majority if and only if the inequality
(0.5− αA)γA < (0.5− αB)γB (5)
holds. Thus, for an opinion to achieve the majority it is required that it is being supported by
a sufficiently large density of inflexibles, and/or a sufficiently small frequency of contrarians
among the floaters.
Given densities αA and αB of inflexibles for the two opinions, a change in the frequencies of
contrarians from 0 into small values γA and γB causes the bifurcation from a collection of
neutrally stable equilibria for
−−−−−−→
f1;αA,αB ;0,0 into a unique stable equilibrium for
−−−−−−−−→
f1;αA,αB ;γA,γB .
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The opinion which has the majority on this equilibrium is determined by inequality (5).
In case αA = αB = α, the opinion with the smaller frequency of contrarians obtains the
majority. Conversely, given different frequencies γA and γB of contrarian floaters for the
two opinions, in the absence of inflexibles the dynamics
−−−−−−→
f1;0,0;γA,γB has pˆ =
γB
γA+γB
as its
unique stable equilibrium, on which the opinion with the smaller frequency of contrarians
has the majority. Fixing sufficiently small densities αA and αB of both opinions as inflexibles,
this equilibrium slightly shifts but leaves the majority unaltered. In case γA = γB, in the
absence of inflexibles the equilibrium pˆ equals 0.5, and the introduction of small densities of
inflexibles for both opinions changes this equilibrium into one on which the opinion with the
larger density of inflexibles takes the majority. Figure 1 illustrates these conclusions.
[Figure 1 about here.]
Figure 2 gives a qualitative overview of the outcomes of the possible opinion dynamics
−−−−−−−−→
f1;αA,αB ;γA,γB .
[Figure 2 about here.]
Figure 2: An overview of the opinion dynamics of f1;αA,αB ;γA,γB , for values αA and αB as
indicated, and with γA and γB in each pane on the horizontal and vertical axis, respectively,
both ranging between 0 and 1. In each pane the line with negative slope γA + γB = 1
is drawn, and possibly an additional dashed line of positive or zero slope. On the line
γA + γB = 1 the function f1;αA,αB ;γA,γB is constant, and the corresponding values of γA
and γB separate between monotone and alternating dynamics, with the monotone dynamics
occurring if 0 < γA + γB < 1, i.e., below the line. The dashed line, if present, gives the
values (γ1, γ2) 6= (0, 0) for which the equilibrium of the opinion dynamics equals 0.5, and
is determined by the expression (αA − 0.5)γA − (αB − 0.5)γB = 0. Opinion A obtains the
majority if (and only if) (αA−0.5)γA− (αB−0.5)γB > 0 holds, i.e., if αB < 0.5 and (γA, γB)
lies above the dashed line. The panes for values (αA, αB) for which αA + αB = 1 represent
degenerate cases, in the sense that these values allow for only one density pˆ = αA for the A
opinion to occur.
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3 L = 2
In groups of size 2 the number of members that support the A or B opinion may be equal,
in which case a tie occurs. We shall deal with the neural treatment in case of a tie, in which
each supporter keeps its own opinion.
Appendix 6.2 shows the table for this case. We obtain
pt+1 = f2;αA,αB ;0,0(pt) = pt, (6)
which is obvious, since in groups of size 2 no majorities can occur, and, in case of a tie, the
neutral application of the local majority rule does not have any effect. Incorporating the
effect of non-contrarian as well as contrarina floaters, the table yields that
pt+1 = f2;αA,αB ;γA,γB(pt) = αAγA + (1− αB)γB +
(
1− (γA + γB)
)
pt. (7)
Thus, for groups of size 2 the effect of the neutral application of the local majority rule and
the contrarians is the same as for groups of size 1.
4 L = 3
Group size 3 is the smallest value of L for which the local majority rule becomes effective
due to possible group compositions in which a majority of one of the two opinions occurs.
As a consequence, the generated dynamics allows for features different from those for group
sizes 1 and 2. Careful bookkeeping based on the table in Appendix 6.3 yields that
pt+1 = f3;αA,αB ;γA,γB(pt)
= αA(1− γA) + (1− αB)γB −
(
2αA(1− 2γA)− γA + γB
)
pt
+
(
3 + αA(1− 2γA)− αB(1− 2γB)− 4γA − 2γB
)
p2t − 2
(
1− γA − γB
)
p3t
= pt + αA(1− γA) + (1− αB)γB −
(
1 + 2αA(1− 2γA)− γA + γB
)
pt
+
(
3 + αA(1− 2γA)− αB(1− 2γB)− 4γA − 2γB
)
p2t − 2
(
1− γA − γB
)
p3t .
(8)
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For clarity we start the analysis of the generated opinion dynamics with the symmetric case
of equal densities of inflexibles and equal fractions of contrarians for both opinions.
4.1 The fully symmetric case: αA = αB and γA = γB
Taking αA = αB = α and γA = γB = γ, we obtain that
pt+1 = f3;α,α;γ,γ(pt) = pt + (1− 2pt)
(
γ + α(1− 2γ)− (1− 2γ)pt + (1− 2γ)p2t
)
(9)
As an illustration to expression 9, Figure 3 shows a collection of graphs of f3;α,α;γ,γ as function
of p, for α = 0.1 and several values of γ.
[Figure 3 about here.]
From expression (9) the analysis of the generated opinion dynamics is straightforward. We
give an overview.
Symmetry considerations imply that the dynamics
−−−−−→
f3;α,α;γ,γ has p = 0.5 as an equilibrium,
for any choice of α ∈ [0, 0.5] and γ ∈ [0, 1]. In addition to parameter combinations α and γ
for which this equilibrium is unique and stable, there are combinations which allow for an
unstable repelling equilibrium pˆ = 0.5 in combination with two other, asymptotically stable,
equilibria, or with two asymptotically stable periodic points of minimal period 2. Details for
these possibilities to appear are derived in Appendix 6.4, here we confine ourselves to the
outcome.
Let the critical curves c3 and C3 be defined as follows:
c3 = {(α, γ) ∈ [0, 0.5]× [0, 1] : (3− 4α)(1− 2γ) = 2}, (10)
and
C3 = {(α, γ) ∈ [0, 0.5]× [0, 1] : (3− 4α)(1− 2γ) = −2}. (11)
Figure 4 shows the curves c3 and C3 in the (α, γ)-parameter space. On c3 the derivative
f ′3;α,α;γ,γ(0.5) equals 1, whereas on C3 this derivative equals -1. The two corner areas in
Figure 4 enclosed by either c3 or C3 are the regions of parameter combinations for which 0.5 is
unstable; outside these regions (including the curves) 0.5 is the unique asymptotically stable
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equilibrium for
−−−−−→
f3;α,α;γ,γ, independent of the initial condition. The lower left corner region is
the area for which the dynamics
−−−−−→
f3;α,α;γ,γ has two asymptotically stable equilibria pˆ3;α,α;γ,γ.
Given parameter combinations (α, γ) in this region, the opinion dynamics eventually will
stabilize on an equilibrium on which the opinion with the initial majority will have maintained
its majority. In case (α, γ) 6= (0, 0), this equilibrium is mixed; if neither inflexibles nor
contrarians are present for both opinions, i.e. (α, γ) = (0, 0), the equilibrium is a single state
attractor with only one opinion present. These results generalize those obtained in [4] for
the case of equal densities of inflexibles and no contrarians for both opinions. For parameter
combinations in the upper left corner region in Figure 4, the dynamics has two attracting
periodic points of period 2. Here an initial majority does not guarantee the eventual majority,
since the dynamics is such that both opinions alternately switch between minority and
majority.
[Figure 4 about here.]
Thus, if both opinions are being supported by equal densities α of inflexibles and equal
fractions γ of contrarians among the floaters, for an opinion to obtain the majority it is
necessary that α as well as γ are sufficiently small, and that it has the initial majority.
Also, with increasing α (γ), the maximum value of γ (α) for which a majority is attainable
decreases. If no inflexibles are present, the fraction of contrarians among the floaters must
be less than approximately 17% (
100
6
%) for a majority to be realizable, and if the fraction
of contrarians among the floaters equals 0, the density of inflexibles must be less than 25%.
If in the parameter space a combination (α, γ) approaches from within a corner towards
one of the two critical curves, then the two additional equilibria or periodic points approach
towards p = 0.5; a withdrawal in the parameter space results in the opposite movement
of the additional equilibria or periodic points. It follows that when passing through c3, the
dynamics
−−−−−→
f3;α,α;γ,γ undergoes a supercritical pitchfork bifurcation, and when passing through
C3 the dynamics undergoes a period doubling bifurcation (flip bifurcation).
4.2 The general case
We now return to the general expression (8) and give an overview of the possible outcomes
of the dynamics
−−−−−−−−→
f3;αA,αB ;γA,γB . The analytical background is given in Appendix 6.5. We
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distinguish several cases.
1. γA + γB = 1.
For γA and γB such that γA + γB = 1, the function f3;αA,αB ;γA,γB is quadratic in p.
The corresponding opinion dynamics
−−−−−−−−−−→
f3;αA,αB ;γA,1−γA has a unique stable equilibrium
in the interval [αA, 1 − αB]. For (γA, γB) = (0.5, 0.5), the function f3;αA,αB ;0.5,0.5 be-
comes constant and equals f3;αA,αB ;0.5,0.5(p) = 0.5(1 + αA − αB); it allows for a unique
stable equilibrium pˆ = 0.5(1 + αA − αB), on which opinion A has the majority if and
only if αA > αB. The following two figures distinguish between parameter combina-
tions αA, αB and γA for which the A opinion obtains either the majority or minority
in equilibrium (Figure 5), and for which the equilibrium is approached monotonically
or alternately (Figure 6). It follows that with increasing value of γA, the region of
parameter combinations (αA, αB) for which opinion A obtains the majority, decreases.
In addition, if γA ≤ 0.5, the A opinion can obtain the majority for any value of αA,
provided that αB is sufficiently small; if γA > 0.5, αA must be sufficiently large and
αB sufficiently small for an A majority to occur.
[Figure 5 about here.]
[Figure 6 about here.]
2. γA + γB 6= 1.
The expression f3;αA,αB ;γA,γB(p)− p = 0 for determining the equilibria is
f3;αA,αB ;γA,γB(p)− p
= αA(1− γA) + (1− αB)γB −
(
1 + 2αA(1− 2γA)− γA + γB
)
p+
(
3 + αA(1− 2γA)− αB(1− 2γB)− 4γA − 2γB
)
p2 − 2
(
1− γA − γB
)
p3
= 0.
(12)
The number of solutions is determined by its discriminant, which is denoted by
D(αA, αB; γA, γB). The expression for the discriminant is derived in Appendix 6.5;
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here we discuss its implications.
For parameter combinations (αA, αB; γA, γB) such that D(αA, αB; γA, γB) > 0, the
equation f3;αA,αB ;γA,γB(p)− p = 0 has a unique real solution. If D(αA, αB; γA, γB) < 0,
there are three real solutions. However, these solutions do not necessarily have to be-
long to the interval [αA, 1 − αB] (but if a solution lies in this interval, it clearly is an
equilibrium for the dynamics
−−−−−−−−→
f3;αA,αB ;γA,γB). If D(αA, αB; γA, γB) = 0 there are three
real solutions, of which at least two coincide; if this happens in the interval [αA, 1−αB],
the parameter combination is at a bifurcation point, discriminating between dynamics
with either a unique equilibrium or three equilibria. If at the bifurcation point exactly
two of the three solutions coincide, the coinciding solutions form a semistable equilib-
rium.
Figure 7 shows a collection of signplots for the discriminant, for values αA and αB as
indicated, and with γA and γB for each signplot between 0 and 1. In addition the
outcome of the analysis for parameter combinations (αA, αB; γA, 1 − γA) is included,
as well as the results of the analysis for combinations (α, α; γ, γ). Figure 14 in Ap-
pendix 6.5 shows an extended version of Figure 7 that includes more values of αA and
αB. It shows that for both αA and αB larger than 0.3, there is not much qualitative
change in the signplots of the determinant D(αA, αB; γA, γB).
[Figure 7 about here.]
Figure 7: A collection of panes, for values αA and αB as indicated, and γA and γB
for each pane ranging between 0 and 1, with γA on the horizontal axis and γB on the
vertical axis. In each pane the signplot of the discriminant D(αA, αB; γA, γB) is shown
for points (γA, γB) for which γA + γB 6= 1. White areas represent the parameter com-
binations with a positive discriminant (i.e., combinations for which the corresponding
opinion dynamics has a unique equilibrium), and in dark regions the discriminant is
negative (the corresponding opinion dynamics then has 3 different equilibria, but not
necessarily in the interval [αA, 1−αB]). In each pane, on the line γA+γB = 1 a density
plot of the equilibrium density pˆ3;αA,αB ;γ,1−γ is given. An increasing gray level indicates
an increasing equilibrium value, with graylevel 0 (black) representing a density 0, and
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graylevel 1 (white) representing density 1. Furthermore, in panes for which αA = αB
holds, on the line γA = γB in the black regions (i.e., a negative discriminant) in white
the points are indicated for which the equilibrium pˆ = 0.5 for
−−−−−−−−→
f3;αA,αB ;γA,γB is unstable;
other points on the lines γA = γB (for αA = αB) indicate parameter combinations for
which pˆ = 0.5 is stable (as follows from Figure 4).
The discriminant becomes singular for parameter combinations (αA, αB; γA, γB) with
γA + γB = 1. In approaching such parameter combinations for which (γA, γB) 6=
(0.5, 0.5), the value of D(αA, αB; γA, γB) goes to −∞. For (γA, γB) = (0.5, 0.5), the
limit generically equals +∞ when this point is approached from the region γA+γB < 1;
the limit equals −∞ in case it is approached from the other side, i.e., from the region
γA + γB > 1. (In case (0.5, 0.5) is approached along the zero set of D(αA, αB; γA, γB),
i.e., in each pane in Figures 7 and 14 along the boundary that distinguishes between
the white and black regions and touches with the line γA + γB = 1, the limit clearly
equals 0.)
Our further discussion of the opinion dynamics
−−−−−−−−→
f3;αA,αB ;γA,γB is based on Figures 7
and 14. Instead of a detailed analytical treatment, we continue with a number of
characteristic outcomes of the opinion dynamics.
A first characteristic that draws attention in Figure 7 is the existence of a wedge-shaped
region of parameter combinations (αA, αB; γA, γB) with negative discriminant for sufficiently
small values of all four parameters. For the cases with both αA = αB and γA = γB within this
region, we already found the existence of two attracting equilibria, symmetrically positioned
with respect to a third, unstable equilibrium 0.5. We therefore expect also to find a similar
pattern of three equilibria in [αA, 1 − αB] for deviations from such symmetric cases within
the wedge-shaped region. In [4] it has been derived that this is indeed the case in the absence
of contrarians, i.e., for parameter combinations for which γA = γB = 0, and for αA and αB
sufficiently small. Figure 8, which shows a number of graphs of functions f3;αA,αB ;γA,γB for
relatively small values αA, αB, γA and γB, implies the same pattern: in case the determinant
D(αA, αB; γA, γB) is negative, the opinion dynamics has two attracting equilibria that are
separated by an unstable one. The two attracting equilibria differ with respect to the opinion
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by which they are dominated. By leaving the wedge-shaped area, a bifurcation in the opinion
dynamics occurs on its boundary D(αA, αB; γA, γB) = 0. Generically, when moving from
inside the wedge-shaped area towards this boundary, the unstable equilibrium and one of
the two stable equilibria move towards each other, and at the bifurcation point merge (thus
causing a supercritical saddle-node bifurcation). Once the boundary has been crossed, the
region of parameters with a positive discriminant is entered, and the dynamics is left with
one attracting equilibrium. On this equilibrium opinion A dominates if the upper part of
the boundary is crossed, i.e., when γB > γA; opinion B has the majority when the right-
hand side of the boundary is passed, on which γA > γB holds. This is also illustrated
in Figure 8. The occurrence of such a bifurcation may lead to a drastic change in the
outcome of the opinion dynamics: whereas inside the wedge-shaped region the outcome of
the opinion dynamics depends on the initial condition, outside the wedge-shaped area the
opinion dynamics will end on the unique equilibrium, independent of the initial condition.
At the bifurcation point at the endpoint of the sharp region of the wedge-shaped area a
supercritical pitchfork bifurcation occurs, in which the three equilibria merge together into
one attracting equilibrium.
[Figure 8 about here.]
Figure 8: Four panes of graphs of functions f3;αA,αB ;γA,γB for relatively small values αA, αB,
γA and γB, with (αA, αB) as indicated below each pane. In each of the four panes, γA and
γB satisfy γA + γB = 0.2. The color coding of the graphs is as follows: red corresponds
to γA = 0, for green γA = 0.05, for blue γA = 0.1, for purple γA = 0.15, and for magenta
γA = 0.2. I.e., in the corresponding panes in Figure 7 we traverse the line γA + γB = 0.2
from its upper left point on the γA = 0 axis to its lower right point on the γB = 0 axis, thus
passing through regions with positive, zero as well as negative discriminant. Above each
pane the densities for opinion A are presented, as obtained by the corresponding opinion
dynamics
−−−−−−−−→
f3;αA,αB ;γA,γB , with initial density p = 0.5.
The white regions in Figure 7 (and also in Figure 14) are formed by the parameter combi-
nations for which the discriminant D(αA, αB; γA, γB) is positive. The corresponding opinion
dynamics then have a unique equilibrium, which (for the parameter combinations in Fig-
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ure 7) is approached monotonically. Figure 9 shows a number of graphs f3;αA,αB ;γA,γB for
parameter combinations with a positive discriminant. The Figure indicates that for small
values of γA and large values of γB opinion A dominates in equilibrium, and that the domin-
ion shift towards the alternative opinion if the fraction of contrarians among the A floaters
increases and that among the B floaters decreases.
[Figure 9 about here.]
For given parameters αA and αB, crossing the boundary of the white area in any direction
away from the lower left corner leads to the occurrence of a saddle-node bifurcation, now
however outside the domain [αA, 1 − αB] of the functions f3;αA,αB ;γA,γB (maintaining an
attracting equilibrium in the domain). Therefore in the black region thus entered, the opinion
dynamics also is characterized by a unique attracting equilibrium. Proceeding towards the
upper right corner, the line of parameter combinations (γA, γB) satisfying γA + γB = 1 is
crossed. On this line the discriminant D(αA, αB; γA, γB) is singular, and the corresponding
opinion dynamics have been analyzed in 4.2.1.
In the black area in the upper right corner, for equal and sufficiently small values αA =
αB = α and sufficiently large and equal values γA = γB = γ it has been derived earlier that−−−−−−−→
fαA,αB ;γA,γB has a unique unstable equilibrium pˆ = 0.5, which causes the convergence of the
dynamics towards an attracting periodic orbit of period 2. Neither of the two opinions then
achieves the definite majority. The values α and γ for which this occurs have been derived in
4.1, and are represented in Figures 7 and 14 by white line segments in the upper right corners.
For these parameter combinations the discriminant of the equation f3;αA,αB ;γA,γB(p)− p = 0
is negative and thus has three different solutions, of which two are situated outside the
domain [αA, 1− αB]. Continuity arguments imply that this behavior will be maintained for
parameter combinations sufficiently close to these line segments. Figure 10 illustrates this.
If the parameter combinations are sufficiently far removed from these line segments but γA
and γB are still relatively large (i.e., for given αA and αB, in the upper right corner), the
dynamics will converge alternately to a unique equilibrium. I.e., by moving away from the
manifold determined by the constraints αA = αB and γA = γB with large values γA and γB,
a flip bifurcation occurs in which the attracting periodic 2 orbit collapses to an attracting
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equilibrium point. This is illustrated by Figure 11. On the attractor the dominion shifts
towards opinion B with increasing γA and decreasing γB.
[Figure 10 about here.]
Figure 10: Four panes of graphs of functions f3;αA,αB ;γA,γB for relatively small values αA and
αB, and with γA and γB satisfying γA + γB = 1.8. The values of γA and γB are indicated
below each of the four panes. The color coding of the graphs is as follows: red corresponds
to γA = 0.8, for green γA = 0.85, for blue γA = 0.9, for purple γA = 0.95, and for magenta
γA = 1. I.e., for given (αA, αB), we traverse the line γA + γB = 1.8 from its upper left
point on the γB = 1 line to its lower right point on the γA = 1 line. Above each pane the
densities for opinion A are presented, as obtained by the corresponding opinion dynamics
−−−−−−−−→
f3;αA,αB ;γA,γB , with initial density p = 0.5.
[Figure 11 about here.]
Figure 11: Four panes of graphs of functions f3;αA,αB ;γA,γB for relatively small values αA and
αB, and with γA and γB satisfying γA + γB = 1.7. The values of γA and γB are indicated
below each of the four panes. The color coding of the graphs is as follows: red corresponds
to γA = 0.7, for green γA = 0.8, for blue γA = 0.85, for purple γA = 0.9, and for magenta
γA = 1. I.e., for given (αA, αB), we traverse the line γA + γB = 1.7 from its upper left
point on the γB = 1 line to its lower right point on the γA = 1 line. Above each pane the
densities for opinion A are presented, as obtained by the corresponding opinion dynamics
−−−−−−−−→
f3;αA,αB ;γA,γB , with initial density p = 0.5.
We end our discussion by presenting some additional opinion dynamics
−−−−−−−−→
f3;αA,αB ;γA,γB for
parameter combinations from both the regions with positive and negative discriminant. We
consider cases with (αA, αB) = (0.1, 0.4) and with (αA, αB) = (0.5, 0.3), i.e., a case with small
αA and intermediate αB, and one with both αA and αB intermediate. The corresponding
graphs of f3;αA,αB ;γA,γB are represented in Figures 12 and 13, for several values of γA and γB.
All cases allow for a unique attracting equilibrium. High values of both γA and γB lead to
alternating convergence. Furthermore, a decrease in the fraction of contrarians among the
floaters of an opinion increases the density of this opinion in equilibrium.
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[Figure 12 about here.]
Figure 12: The left column shows four panes of graphs of functions f3;0.1,0.4;γA,γB , for different
combinations of γA and γB. The color coding for the different rows is given in the following
table, with in the second to fifth column the values of γA:
γA + γB red green blue purple magenta
1st (upper) row: 1.8 0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95 1
2nd row: 1.2 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
3rd row: 0.8 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
4th row: 0.2 0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2
The right column of the Figure shows the densities of opinion A as generated by the corre-
sponding opinion dynamics for initial value p = 0.5.
[Figure 13 about here.]
Figure 13: The left column shows four panes of graphs of functions f3;0.5,0.3;γA,γB , for different
combinations of γA and γB. The color coding for the different rows is as follows, with in the
second to fifth columns the values of γA:
γA + γB red green blue purple magenta
1st (upper) row: 1.8 0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95 1
2nd row: 1.2 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
3rd row: 0.8 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
4th row: 0.2 0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2
The right column of the Figure shows the densities of opinion A as generated by the corre-
sponding opinion dynamics for initial value p = 0.5.
5 Conclusions
The results presented re-establish those derived in [2], which concerned communities of non-
contrarian and contrarian floaters, and [4], which studied the combined effects of inflexibles
and non-contrarian floaters. The distinctive patterns of opinion dynamics are not character-
ized by complete quantitative detail. Rather, the results intend to point to possible outcomes
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of opinion dynamics. We conclude that various kinds of dynamics may occur. In case the
local majority rule followed by the contrarian changes are applied for group sizes L = 1 or
2, the opinion dynamics generically converges to a unique equilibrium. In case the sum of
fractions of contrarians for the two opinions is larger than 2, the equilibrium generically is
approached alternately, otherwise the dynamics generically shows a monotone approach. For
an opinion to obtain the majority in equilibrium, it is required that this opinion is supported
by a sufficiently large density of inflexibles in combination with a sufficiently small fraction
of contrarians, as expressed by condition (5).
Group size L = 3 allows for additional outcomes for the opinion dynamics. For sufficiently
small densities of inflexibles for both opinions, and in addition sufficiently small fractions of
contrarians among the floaters for the two opinions, the dynamics allows for two attracting
equilibria, that differ in which opinion has the majority. The opinion that eventually will
achieve the majority thus is determined by the initial condition, and an opinion that has
a fraction of contrarians that is sufficiently smaller than that of the alternative opinion,
may achieve the majority in equilibrium, although initially it may be present as a minority.
For small values of inflexibles in combination with sufficiently large fractions of contrarians
among the floaters, the generated opinion dynamics causes alternating convergence to a pe-
riod 2 stable orbit (Figure 10). An increase of the densities of inflexibles or a slight lowering
of at least one of the fractions of contrarians causes the collapse of the attracting periodic or-
bit into an equilibrium, but maintains the alternating behavior (Figure 11). For a relatively
large collection of parameter combinations the dynamics ends up on a unique attracting
equilibrium, which is approached either monotonically or alternating (see e.g. Figures 6
and 13). An increase in the fraction of contrarians among the floaters of an opinion leads to
a decrease of the density of that opinion in equilibrium. Thus, for an opinion to achieve the
majority in equilibrium, a small fraction of contrarians among its floaters is favorable.
In [2], the “hung elections” outcome in recent votings has been attributed to the interplay of
non-contrarian and contrarian floaters. Likewise, the present paper may shed a light on the
(dis)appearance of alternating opinion dynamics. The recent wins by Barack Obama and
Hillary Clinton in two consecutive pre-elections for the Democratic presidential nomination
2008 in the United States may point to the beginning of an alternating series of wins and
losses for both candidates. Whether or not this is the case remains to be seen at the moment
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of writing, but if it does it may point to considerable fractions of contrarians among the
floaters on both sides, in the states that show alternating election outcomes. In case the
alternating pattern converges to a stable period 2 cycle, the uncertainty who will win the
nomination will linger on until the final decisive event. (Note that since the outcome of an
election in an alternating environment depends on the moment the election actually takes
place, it may happen that in subsequent state elections the same winner occurs. This is
however no indication of sustained major support. Furthermore, in a sequence of alternating
environments, a large number of subsequent wins for the same candidate seems unlikely.)
If however the alternating changes are converging to an equilibrium, one of the candidates
eventually will reach a decisive majority. Due to the sensitivity of politics for influences, a
change in parameter values may easily occur, either with respect to the densities of inflexi-
bles or to the fractions of contrarians. This may result in a switch from the one alternating
pattern into the other one, or even into monotone convergence towards an equilibrium. Al-
though our framework does not map unequivocally to real communities, we think it may
hint at possible explanations of outcomes of opinion dynamics.
In forthcoming papers we plan to continue the study of opinion dynamics, by focusing on
communities in which more than two opinions are being supported. Also mathematical
aspects of opinion dynamics for group sizes larger than 3 will be studied.
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6 Appendices
Subsections 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3 present tables for groups of sizes L = 1, 2 and 3 from which
the density of the A opinion is derived after application of the l.m.r. and the switch by the
contrarians, given an initial density p for the A opinion. Each table consists of four columns,
of which the first four are separated by arrows. The first column gives the possible group
compositions in terms of inflexibles and non-contrarian and/or contrarian floaters, the second
column gives the effect of the application of the l.m.r. for the group compositions given in
the first column. An application is indicated by a horizontal arrow, whose first appearance
in a table is indexed by “l.m.r.”; at other places in the tables this index is omitted. The
third column then gives the effect of the switches by the contrarians if applicable, where it
is understood that a contrarian switches into a floater of the alternative opinion. The final
column gives the contributions of the effect of the l.m.r. and the presence of the contrarians to
the density of the A opinion, weighed with the probability of the original group composition
in the ensemble of all possible groups of fixed size, given the densities αA and αB of the
inflexibles for both opinions, the fractions γA and γB of contrarians among the floaters of
the A and B opinion, respectively, and the densities p−αA for the A floaters and 1−αB− p
for the B floaters. The total sum of these contributions yields fL;αA,αB ;γA,γB(p).
In each table the following notation is being used:
Ai inflexible of the A opinion,
Af floater of the A opinion,
Anc non-contrarian floater of the A opinion,
Ac contrarian floater of the A opinion,
Afnc floater of the A opinion coming from a B non-contrarian floater after application
of the l.m.r.,
Afc floater of the A opinion coming from a B contrarian floater after application
of the l.m.r.,
and
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Bi inflexible of the B opinion,
Bf floater of the B opinion,
Bnc non-contrarian floater of the B opinion,
Bc contrarian floater of the B opinion,
Bfnc floater of the B opinion coming from a A non-contrarian floater after application
of the l.m.r.,
Bfc floater of the B opinion coming from a A contrarian floater after application
of the l.m.r..
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6.1 Table for group size 1
Ai Ai αA
l.m.r
Anc Anc (1− γA)(p− αA)
Ac Ac Bf 0
Bi Bi 0
Bnc Bnc 0
Bc Bc Af γB(1− αB − p)
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6.2 Table for group size 2
Ai, Ai Ai, Ai α
2
A
l.m.r
Ai, Anc Ai, Anc 2αA(1− γA)(p− αA)
Ai, Ac Ai, Ac Ai, Bf αAγA(p− αA)
Ai, Bi AiBi αAαB
Ai, Bnc Ai, Bnc αA(1− γB)(1 − αB − p)
Ai, Bc Ai, Bc Ai, Af 2αAγB(1− αB − p)
Anc, Anc Anc, Anc (1− γA)2(p− αA)2
Anc, Ac Anc, Ac Anc, Bf γA(1− γA)(p− αA)2
Anc, Bi Anc, Bi αB(1− γA)(p− αA)
Anc, Bnc Anc, Bnc (1− γA)(1 − γB)(p− αA)(1− αB − p)
Anc, Bc Anc, Bc Anc, Af 2(1− γA)γB(p− αA)(1− αB − p)
Ac, Ac Ac, Ac Bf , Bf 0
Ac, Bi Ac, Bi Bf , Bi 0
Ac, Bnc Ac, Bnc Bf , Bnc 0
Ac, Bc Ac, Bc Bf , Af γAγB(p− αA)(1− αB − p)
Bi, Bi Bi, Bi 0
Bi, Bnc Bi, Bnc 0
Bi, Bc Bi, Bc Bi, Af αBγB(1− αB − p)
Bnc, Bnc Bnc, Bnc 0
Bnc, Bc Bnc, Bc Bnc, Af γB(1− γB)(1 − αB − p)2
Bc, Bc Bc, Bc Af , Af γ
2
B(1− αB − p)2
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6.3 Table for group size 3
Ai, Ai, Ai Ai, Ai, Ai α
3
A
l.m.r
Ai, Ai, Anc Ai, Ai, Anc 3α2A(1− γA)(p− αA)
Ai, Ai, Ac Ai, Ai, Ac Ai, Ai, Bf 2α2AγA(p− αA)
Ai, Ai, Bi Ai, Ai, Bi 2α2AαB
Ai, Ai, Bnc Ai, Ai, Af 3α2A(1− γB)(1 − αB − p)
Ai, Ai, Bc Ai, Ai, Afc Ai, Ai, Bf 2α2AγB(1− αB − p)
Ai, Anc, Anc Ai, Anc, Anc 3αA(1− γA)2(p− αA)2
Ai, Anc, Ac Ai, Anc, Ac Ai, Anc, Bf 4αAγA(1− γA)(p− αA)2
Ai, Anc, Bi Ai, Anc, Bi 4αAαB(1− γA)(p− αA)
Ai, Anc, Bnc Ai, Anc, Af 6αA(1− γA)(1 − γB)(p− αA)×
(1− αB − p)
Ai, Anc, Bc Ai, Anc, Afc Ai, Anc, Bf 4αAγB(1− γA)(p− αA)(1 − αB − p)
Ai, Ac, Ac Ai, Ac, Ac Ai, Bf , Bf αAγ
2
A(p− αA)2
Ai, Ac, Bi Ai, Ac, Bi Ai, Bf , Bi 2αAαBγA(p− αA)
Ai, Ac, Bnc Ai, Ac, Af Ai, Bf , Af 4αAγA(1− γB)(p− αA)(1 − αB − p)
Ai, Ac, Bc Ai, Ac, Afc Ai, Bf , Bf 2αAγAγB(p− αA)(1− αB − p)
Ai, Bi, Bi Ai, Bi, Bi αAα
2
B
Ai, Bi, Bnc Ai, Bi, Bnc 2αAαB(1− γB)(1 − αB − p)
Ai, Bi, Bc Ai, Bi, Bc Ai, Bi, Af 4αAαBγB(1− αB − p)
Ai, Bnc, Bnc Ai, Bnc, Bnc αA(1− γB)2(1− αB − p)2
Ai, Bnc, Bc Ai, Bnc, Bc Ai, Bnc, Af 4αAγB(1− γB)(1 − αB − p)2
Ai, Bc, Bc Ai, Bc, Bc Ai, Af , Af 3αAγ2B(1− αB − p)2
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Anc, Anc, Anc Anc, Anc, Anc (1− γA)3(p− αA)3
Anc, Anc, Ac Anc, Anc, Ac Anc, Anc, Bf 2γA(1− γA)2(p− αA)3
Anc, Anc, Bi Anc, Anc, Bi 2αB(1− γA)2(p− αA)2
Anc, Anc, Bnc Anc, Anc, Af 3(1− γA)2(1− γB)(p− αA)2×
(1− αB − p)
Anc, Anc, Bc Anc, Anc, Afc Anc, Anc, Bf 2γB(1− γA)2(p− αA)2×
(1− αB − p)
Anc, Ac, Ac Anc, Ac, Ac Anc, Bf , Bf (1− γA)γ2A(p− αA)3
Anc, Ac, Bi Anc, Ac, Bi Anc, Bf , Bi 2αBγA(1− γA)(p− αA)2
Anc, Ac, Bnc Anc, Ac, Af Anc, Bf , Af 4γA(1− γA)(1 − γB)(p− αA)2×
(1− αB − p)
Anc, Ac, Bc Anc, Ac, Afc Anc, Bf , Bf 2γAγB(1− γA)(p− αA)2×
(1− αB − p)
Anc, Bi, Bi Bf , Bi, Bi 0
Anc, Bi, Bnc Bf , Bi, Bnc 0
Anc, Bi, Bc Bf , Bi, Bc Bf , Bi, Af 2αBγB(1− γA)(p− αA)×
(1− αB − p)
Anc, Bnc, Bnc Bf , Bnc, Bnc 0
Anc, Bnc, Bc Bf , Bnc, Bc Bf , Bnc, Af 2γB(1− γA)(1 − γB)(p− αA)×
(1− αB − p)2
Anc, Bc, Bc Bf , Bc, Bc Bf , Af , Af 2(1− γA)γ2B(p− αA)(1 − αB − p)2
Ac, Ac, Ac Ac, Ac, Ac Bf , Bf , Bf 0
Ac, Ac, Bi Ac, Ac, Bi Bf , Bf , Bi 0
Ac, Ac, Bnc Ac, Ac, Af Bf , Bf , Af (1− γB)γ2A(p− αA)2(1− αB − p)
Ac, Ac, Bc Ac, Ac, Afc Bf , Bf , Bf 0
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Ac, Bi, Bi Bfc , Bi, Bi Af , Bi, Bi α
2
BγA(p− αA)
Ac, Bi, Bnc Bfc , Bi, Bnc Af , Bi, Bnc 2αBγA(1− γB)(p− αA)×
(1− αB − p)
Ac, Bi, Bc Bfc , Bi, Bc Af , Bi, Af 4αBγAγB(p− αA)(1 − αB − p)
Ac, Bnc, Bnc Bfc , Bnc, Bnc Af , Bnc, Bnc γA(1− γB)2(p− αA)×
(1− αB − p)2
Ac, Bnc, Bc Bfc , Bnc, Bc Af , Bnc, Af 4γAγB(1 − γB)(p− αA)×
(1− αB − p)2
Ac, Bc, Bc Bfc , Bc, Bc Af , Af , Af 3γAγ2B(p− αA)(1 − αB − p)2
Bi, Bi, Bi Bi, Bi, Bi 0
Bi, Bi, Bnc Bi, Bi, Bnc 0
Bi, Bi, Bc Bi, Bi, Bc Bi, Bi, Af α
2
BγB(1− αB − p)
Bi, Bnc, Bnc Bi, Bnc, Bnc 0
Bi, Bnc, Bc Bi, Bnc, Bc Bi, Bnc, Af 2αBγB(1− γB)(1 − αB − p)2
Bi, Bc, Bc Bi, Bc, Bc Bi, Af , Af 2αBγ2B(1− αB − p)2
Bnc, Bnc, Bnc Bnc, Bnc, Bnc 0
Bnc, Bnc, Bc Bnc, Bnc, Bc Bnc, Bnc, Af γB(1− γB)2(1− αB − p)3
Bnc, Bc, Bc Bnc, Bc, Bc Bnc, Af , Af 2(1− γB)γ2B(1− αB − p)3
Bc, Bc, Bc Bc, Bc, Bc Af , Af , Af γ
3
B(1− αB − p)3
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6.4 L = 3: analysis for the fully symmetric case αA = αB and
γA = γB
The derivative (with respect to p) f ′3;α,α;γ,γ of the function f3;α,α;γ,γ as given by expression (9)
in the equilibrium pˆ = 0.5 equals 0.5(3− 4α)(1− 2γ). There are two additional equilibria
pˆ3;α,α;γ,γ = 0.5
1− 2γ ±√(1− 2γ)(−2 + (3− 4α)(1− 2γ))
1− 2γ ∈ [α, 1− α] (13)
if and only if 0 ≤ γ < 1
6
and 0 < 1−6γ
1−2γ − 4α. If the two additional equilibria exist they are
symmetrically positioned on opposite sides of 0.5, and asymptotically stable; the equilibrium
0.5 then is unstable, with f ′3;α,α;γ,γ(0.5) > 1.
For α and γ such that 5
6
< γ ≤ 1 and 0 < 5−6γ
1−2γ − 4α, the equilibrium 0.5 also is unstable,
with f ′3;α,α;γ,γ(0.5) < −1. In this case the dynamics
−−−−−→
f3;α,α;γ,γ has two asymptotically stable
periodic points p∗3;α;γ of minimal period 2, symmetrically positioned with respect to 0.5:
p∗3;α,α;γ,γ = 0.5
1− 2γ ±√(1− 2γ)(2 + (3− 4α)(1− 2γ))
1− 2γ ∈ [α, 1− α]. (14)
6.5 L = 3: analysis of the general case
The possible equilibria for
−−−−−−−−→
f3;αA,αB ;γA,γB (in [αA, 1−αB]) follow from solving f3;αA,αB ;γA,γB(p) =
p, under the restriction that p ∈ [αA, 1− αB]. We distinguish several cases.
1. (γA, γB) = (0.5, 0.5): expression (8) equals f3;αA,αB ;0.5,0.5(p) = 0.5(1 + αA − αB), and
allows for a unique stable equilibrium pˆ = 0.5(1 + αA − αB), on which opinion A has
the majority if and only if αA > αB.
2. (γA, γB) 6= (0.5, 0.5), γA + γB = 1: the function f3;αA,αB ;γA,γB is quadratic in p. The
discriminant
D(αA, αB; γA, γB) for the equation f3;αA,αB ;γA,γB(p)− p = 0 equals 4α2B + 4γA(1−α2A−
3α2B)− 4γ2A(1− 2(α2A +α2B)). The opinion dynamics
−−−−−−−−−−→
f3;αA,αB ;γA,1−γA has a unique equi-
librium
pˆ3;αA,αB ;γA,1−γA =
1− γA + (1− 2γA)αA −
√
(1− γA)(1− 2γA)α2B + γA(1− γA)− γA(1− 2γA)α2A
(1− 2γA)(1 + αA + αB)
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in the interval [αA, 1− αB]. The derivative in the equilibrium equals
1− 2√γA(1− γA) + (1− γA)(1− 2γA)α2B − γA(1− 2γA)α2A.
3. γA + γB 6= 1. The expression f3;αA,αB ;γA,γB(p) − p = 0 for determining the equilibria
now is
f3;αA,αB ;γA,γB(p)− p =
αA(1− γA) + (1− αB)γB −
(
1 + 2αA(1− 2γA)− γA + γB
)
pt+
(
3 + αA(1− 2γA)− αB(1− 2γB)− 4γA − 2γB
)
p2t − 2
(
1− γA − γB
)
p3t = 0.
(15)
Its discriminant isD(αA, αB; γA, γB) =
(
1
2
q1(αA, αB; γA, γB)
)2
+
(
1
3
q2(αA, αB; γA, γB)
)3
with
c0(αA, αB; γA, γB) = αA(1− γA) + (1− αB)γB,
c1(αA, αB; γA, γB) = −(1 + 2αA(1− 2γA)− γA + γB),
c2(αA, αB; γA, γB) = 3 + αA(1− 2γA)− αB(1− 2γB)− 4γA − 2γB,
c3(αA, αB; γA, γB) = −2(1− (γA + γB)),
and
q1(αA, αB; γA, γB) =
2
27
(c2(αA, αB; γA, γB)
c3(αA, αB; γA, γB)
)3
−1
3
c2(αA, αB; γA, γB)
c3(αA, αB; γA, γB)
c1(αA, αB; γA, γB)
c3(αA, αB; γA, γB)
+
c0(αA, αB; γA, γB)
c3(αA, αB; γA, γB)
,
q2(αA, αB; γA, γB) = −1
3
(c2(αA, αB; γA, γB)
c3(αA, αB; γA, γB)
)2
+
c1(αA, αB; γA, γB)
c3(αA, αB; γA, γB)
.
Figure 14 shows, in three parts, a signplot of the discriminant for this case. In addition
the results of the analysis for combinations (α, α; γ, γ) is included.
[Figure 14 about here.]
[Figure 15 about here.]
[Figure 16 about here.]
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Figure 1: Figure a shows the graphs of f1;0.2,0.2;0,0 (which coincides with the diagonal) and
f1;0.2,0.2;0.075,0.05 as functions of p on the interval [0.2, 0.8]. By changing the frequencies of
contrarians from (γA, γB) = (0, 0) into (γA, γB) = (0.075, 0.05), the collection of neutrally
stable equilibria (the diagonal) bifurcates into a unique stable equilibrium pˆ = 0.44 on which
the B opinion has the majority. Figure b shows the diagonal together with the graph of
f1;0,0;0.2,0.2 on [0, 1], and the graph of f1;0.15,0.175;0.2,0.2 on [0.15, 0.825], both as functions of p.
The dashed lines indicate the boundaries of the interval [0.15, 0.825]. The graphs of the two
functions almost coincide on this interval. The dynamics generated by these two functions
have pˆ = 0.5 and pˆ = 0.4875 as their respective stable equilibria.
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Figure 3: Graphs of f3;0.1,0.1;γ,γ as function of p ∈ [0.1, 0.9], with values γ as indicated at
each specific graph. In addition, the diagonal and the line 1− p are drawn.
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Figure 4: The critical curves c3 and C3 in the (α, γ)-parameter space
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Figure 5: The different panes, distinguished by different values of γA, have αA on the
horizontal axis and αB on the vertical one. Each pane shows the line αA + αB = 1 and
in addition the dashed line αB =
1− 2γA
3− 2γA +
1 + 2γA
3− 2γAαA of parameter values for which the
equilibrium value pˆ3;αA,αB ;γA,1−γA equals 0.5. Below the dashed lines the equilibrium value
lies above 0.5, i.e., opinion A then obtains the majority. The region αA + αB > 1 is not
involved in the analysis.
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Figure 6: The different panes show in white the region of parameters (αA, αB) for which
the equilibrium pˆ3;αA,αB ;γA,1−γA is approached monotonically; the black regions indicate pa-
rameter combinations for which the equilibrium is approached alternately. For γA = 0.5, the
derivative of f3;αA,αB ;γA,1−γA in the equilibrium equals 0 for all parameter values (αA, αB),
and the equilibrium is reached in one iteration. The line αA + αB = 1 refers again to the
degenerate cases for which the opinion dynamics of density p is restricted to a single density
p = αA. Parameter combinations (αA, αB) for which αA + αB > 1 are not involved in the
analysis.
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Figure 9: Four panes of graphs of functions f3;αA,αB ;γA,γB for relatively small values αA and
αB, and with γA and γB satisfying γA+γB = 0.7. The values of γA and γB are indicated below
each of the four panes. The color coding of the graphs is as follows: red corresponds to γA = 0,
for green γA = 0.2, for blue γA = 0.35, for purple γA = 0.5, and for magenta γA = 0.7. I.e.,
for given (αA, αB), we traverse the line γA+γB = 0.7 from its upper left point on the γA = 0
line to its lower right point on the γB = 0 line. The discriminant D(αA, αB; γA, γB) for the
exposed parameter values is positive, indicating a unique equilibrium for the corresponding
opinion dynamics.
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Figure 14 c
Figure 14: Figures a, b, and c shows a collection of panes with signplots of the discriminant
D(αA, αB; γA, γB), for values αA and αB as indicated, and γA and γB for each pane ranging
between 0 and 1, with γA + γB 6= 1; γA is on the horizontal axis and γB on the vertical
axis. The white areas represent the parameter combinations with a positive discriminant,
and in dark regions the discriminant is negative. On the line γA + γB = 1 in each pane the
discriminant becomes singular. In panes for which αA = αB holds, on the line γA = γB in
the black regions (i.e., a negative discriminant) in white the points are indicated for which
the equilibrium pˆ = 0.5 for
−−−−−−−−→
f3;αA,αB ;γA,γB is unstable; other points on the lines γA = γB
(for αA = αB) indicate parameter combinations for which pˆ = 0.5 is stable (as follows from
Figure 4).
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